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1962/11/03

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-2- 230, November 3, 3 p.m. from Conakry

Nasser and Nehru. Later the Russians put very heavy pressure on Castro not to attend but he went anyway."

Toure continued: "the trouble with Castro is that he did not have the ideological experience or intellectual equipment to resist those in Cuba who wished to align him with the Soviets. I did. When the same elements in our trade union movement and elsewhere tried to push Guinea into the Soviet camp, I knew what they were up to and how to handle them. Castro is too emotional and too naive. But he is still sincere and I think if you Americans handle him intelligently he is not lost."

Toure continued: "what you must remember is to keep this problem in a Soviet - American context. Then Guinea, and I believe all the non-aligned countries, will support you. But if you turn it into a Cuban - American problem in which you seem to be opposing the Cuban revolution, then we will oppose you. Perhaps we can be of some help in restoring Castro to non-alignment but only if you are reasonable after Russians have removed their bases."

I reminded him of the President's assurance that our number one concern were the offensive Soviet weapons near our shores. This seemed to please him. He also agreed that the presence of UN observers in Cuba should add to Castro's sense of security if he seriously feared an invasion.

Toure said he would be glad to talk with Ambassador Bowles during his Conakry visit next week. This should provide additional opportunity to discuss both Cuba and India problems and ascertain or perhaps influence GOC position.

ATTWOOD

LTR/14

Note: Mr. King (AF) notified, advance copy SS, 9 PM, 11/3,
CWO-JSW.

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